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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following a jury trial, Michael Russo was found guilty of one count of rape, one 
count of first degree kidnapping, and one count of burglary. He received an aggregate 
sentence of fixed life. 
On appeal, Mr. Russo asserts two claims of error. First, he contends that the 
district court erred in failing to suppress a cell phone video discovered through a 
warrantless, non-consensual search of his phone. Second, he contends that the district 
court erred in allowing the State to present irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence 
concerning his deviant sexual interests. Mr. Russo requests that his convictions and 
sentences be vacated, and that his case be remanded for a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the pre-dawn hours of August 27, 2009, J.W. was raped at knifepoint by a 
masked man in her Nampa apartment. (See 8/2/10 Tr., p.200, L.18 - p.220, L.15.)1 
When her assailant left, J.W. quickly called 9-1-1 to report the crime. (8/2/10 Tr., p.191, 
L.17 - p.193, L.2 (testimony of police dispatcher), p.220, L.16 - p.221, L.2, p.22, Ls.2-4 
(testimony of J.W.); Ex. 1 (recording of 9-1-1 call).) 
The investigating officers who responded to J.W.'s report immediately decided 
that Michael Russo would be their suspect.2 (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.289, Ls.18-22.) They 
1 There are a large number of separately-bound transcripts in the record on appeal in 
this case. Accordingly, transcripts are identified herein based on the date of the hearing 
in question. 
2 Mr. Russo was convicted of rape in Washington in 1995. (R., p.129.) Based largely 
on this fact, he would contend, once he moved to Idaho, he became the "usual suspect" 
for any rape or seemingly related crime in the Meridian/Nampa area. (See R., pp.125-
31 (police affidavit outlining the various crimes that Mr. Russo was accused of 
committing prior to this case coming about).) Notably, prior to this case coming about, 
1 
quickly set up surveillance at his Meridian apartment (8/3/10 Tr., p.289, L.24 - p.290, 
L.9, p.294, L.6 - p.296, L.21, p.350, L.7 - p.352, L.23) and, before too long, went about 
securing a search warrant for his residence (see 8/3/10 Tr., p.380, L.19 - p.381, L.18.) 
That warrant, authorizing searches of Mr. Russo's apartment and motorcycle, was 
eventually issued by an Ada County magistrate. (See R., pp.133-34; 8/3/10 Tr., p.381, 
Ls.15-17.) 
While officers had Mr. Russo's apartment under surveillance (and before the 
search warrant had arrived), they observed Mr. Russo leave his residence three times-
once to go behind his apartment building, and twice to check his mailbox. (R., p.142.) 
The third time Mr. Russo left his apartment, which was some time shortly before noon, 
at least two detectives seized, and then searched, him as part of what they referred to 
as "an investigatory detention.,,3 (R., pp.139, 142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.68, Ls.19-23, p.70, 
Ls.13-14, 17-18.) Although they had not observed Mr. Russo do anything illegal, 
possess a weapon, or act in a threatening manner, the detectives immediately 
handcuffed him; searched him, supposedly for weapons; removed his wallet from one of 
his back pockets and his cell phone from one of his front pockets4 ; and then placed 
Mr. Russo in a patrol car. (R., pp.139, 142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.70, L.19.) 
Approximately five minutes later, when another detective (Detective King) arrived, 
Mr. Russo had not been charged with any of the Idaho crimes for which he had been 
accused. 
3 When Mr. Russo asked if he was being arrested, one of the officers told him he was 
not; Detective Cain "told him it was called an investigatory detention." (R., p.142.) 
4 Although the evidence before the district court at the time that Mr. Russo's 
suppression motion was evaluated did not indicate whether Det. Cain knew that 
Mr. Russo's wallet and cell phone were not weapons when he removed them from 
Mr. Russo's pockets (see R., p.142), Det. Cain later testified at trial that he did know 
what they were before he removed them from Mr. Russo's pockets. (See 8/3/10 
Tr., p.356, Ls.1-4.) 
2 
Mr. Russo's cell phone was handed over to that detective. (R., p.142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70, 
Ls.21-25.) Thereafter, Det. King opened the phone and viewed its contents, supposedly 
"to determine ownership" of the phone,s whereupon he discovered a video believed to 
have been taken of the rape of J.W.6 (R., p.154; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70, L.23 - p.71, L.2.) At 
some point after that, based (at least in part) on the video found on his cell phone, 
Mr. Russo was arrested. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.75, Ls.11-25, p.81, L.24 - p.82, L.6.) Also 
based (at least in part) on the video found on the cell phone, the police obtained an 
amended warrant authorizing a search of that phone. (See R., pp.153-54 (relevant 
portion of affidavit in support of amended warrant), 155-57 (amended warrant).) 
On September 3, 2009, a grand jury indicted Mr. Russo on one count of rape, 
one count offirst degree kidnapping, and one count of burglary. (R., pp.1 0-12.) 
On January 7, 2010, while he was awaiting trial, Mr. Russo filed, pursuant to the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as we" as Article 
I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, a motion to suppress, inter alia, the evidence 
discovered on his cell phone.? (R., pp.73-75.) Mr. Russo argued that neither his 
detention and search, nor the search of his phone, was undertaken pursuant to a 
5 At the time that it evaluated Mr. Russo's suppression motion, the evidence before the 
district court-a sworn affidavit in support of an amended search warrant-indicated 
that Det. King searched the phone's contents "to determine ownership." (R., p.154.) At 
trial, however, Det. King testified that he searched Mr. Russo's phone "to see if there 
was [sic] and photos or videos on there." (8/3/10 Tr., p.492, Ls.15-19.) 
6 The 8-second video clip depicts a close-up view of a male and a female engaged in 
vaginal intercourse. Because of the close-up view, no faces are visible and the 
identities of the participants, therefore, are not readily apparent. (See Ex. 49.) 
? Mr. Russo sought suppression of certain evidence on two other grounds (see 
R., pp.73-80 (suppression motion challenging not only the search of the phone, but also 
the issuance of the search warrants and procurement of certain statements made after 
invocation of the right to silence/counsel); however, because those suppression 
arguments are not related to any issue raised on appeal, they are not discussed any 
further herein. 
3 
warrant, and that they exceeded anything that might be permissible pursuant to the 
Terri exception to the warrant requirement. (See R., pp.73-75.) 
In response, the State filed a memorandum in opposition (see R., pp.100-05, 
111-22), and provided a documentary record by which the district court could discern 
the relevant facts (see R., pp.123-59 (exhibits 1 through 6, consisting of the affidavit in 
support of the original search warrant, the original search warrant itself, a police report 
prepared by Det. Palfreyman (one of the detectives who detained and searched 
Mr. Russo), a police report prepared by Det. Cain (the other detective who detained and 
searched Mr. Russo), the affidavit in support of the amended search warrant, and the 
amended search warrant)9). The State argued that Mr. Russo was properly detained 
because police can always detain the occupants of a residence while a search warrant 
is being sought for that residence; however, the State made no attempt to argue that the 
search of Mr. Russo's person and, subsequently, his phone, could have been proper. 
(See R., pp.111-14.) The State then argued that, even if the phone was searched 
illegally, the fruits of the search were not subject to exclusion because of either the 
attenuation doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine, or the independent source 
doctrine. (See R., pp.114-21.) 
8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court, held that 
"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the 
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes 
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to 
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of 
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing 
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him." 
Id. at 30-31. 
9 Later, at the suppression hearing, the district court also agreed to take judicial notice 
of the transcript of the grand jury proceedings in finding the relevant facts. (See 1/27/10 
Tr., p.20, Ls.6-25.) 
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A lengthy hearing, consisting solely of arguments of counsel, was held on 
Mr. Russo's suppression motion on January 27,2010. (See generally 1/27/10 Tr.) At 
that hearing, defense counsel argued, inter alia, that Mr. Russo's phone could not be 
searched pursuant to the warrant authorizing a search of his home and motorcycle 
because the phone was located on Mr. Russo's person, and his person was outside 
when he was detained by the police. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.34, Ls.18-25, p.51, Ls.16-20.) 
In response, the State appears to have augmented the argument presented in its 
briefing, this time asserting that the search of Mr. Russo's cell phone was permissible 
because the original search warrant authorized a search for phones (implicitly 
authorizing a search of those phones, the State argued) and, even if the original search 
warrant did not authorize the search, the amended warrant specifically authorized a 
search of that phone. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.43, Ls.7-23.) The State also argued, as it had 
in its briefing, that regardless of the legality of the search of the phone, "inevitably, that 
cell phone would have been searched as Mr. Russo was being interviewed by Detective 
Weekes" (1/27/10 Tr., p.44, Ls.2-6); however, the State never explained how it was that 
an "investigatory detention" would have inevitably resulted in a search of Mr. Russo's 
phone (see generally 1/27/10 Tr., p.41, L.21 - p.47, L.13).10 
The district court ruled on Mr. Russo's suppression motion from the bench at the 
January 27,2010 hearing. 11 (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.80, L.11 - p.83, L.23.) The district 
10 In its briefing, the State had argued that, even if the original search of the phone was 
unconstitutional, because the police were specifically looking for a cell phone that might 
contain photos or video of J.W.'s rape, having found a phone on Mr. Russo's person the 
police inevitably would have sought a warrant authorizing a search of that phone. 
~R., p.119.) 
1 A few days later, the district court did enter a written order denying Mr. Russo's 
motion; however, that order did not expand upon or clarify the district court's oral ruling, 
as it simply incorporated the "factual findings and conclusions of the law" made on the 
record at the hearing. (See R., p.166.) 
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court concluded that Mr. Russo was properly detained, but it did not reach the issue of 
whether either he (or his phone) was properly searched because the exclusionary rule 
would not apply anyway since the video on the phone would have inevitably been 
discovered. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) The district court reasoned that it 
was inevitable that the video would have been discovered because, even though the 
first search warrant had not arrived yet, it had been issued and it authorized a search for 
phones and implicitly authorized a forensic search of those phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, 
L.22 - p.83, L.23.) 
Also prior to trial, the State sought leave to offer extensive evidence of 
Mr. Russo's alleged "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 
404(b). (See, e.g., R., pp.44-46 (original notice of intent to offer evidence under I.R.E. 
404(b)), pp.47-51 (original motion in limine), 52-72 (memorandum in support of original 
motion in limine), pp.85-88 (reply memorandum in support of original motion in limine), 
pp.187-227 (offer of proof in support of original motion in limine), p.237 (second motion 
in limine), pp.228-35 (memorandum in support of second motion in limine).) Among the 
evidence the State sought to have admitted under Rule 404(b) was evidence that: 
(1) during a police interrogation, Mr. Russo had admitted to Detective Weekes that he 
had sexual fantasies involving rape; and (2) certain pornographic images depicting 
simulated rape were found in Mr. Russo's vehicle. After extensive proceedings on the 
State's proffered Rule 404(b) evidence, the district court ultimately found the rape 
fantasy evidence, and some of the rape pornography evidence, to be admissible. (See 
3/18/10 Tr., p.67, L.14 - p.69, L.9, p.77, L.25 - p.78, L.7 (fantasy evidence), p.67, L.14 
- p.68, L.10, p.78, LS.7-10 (pornography evidence); 4/22/10 Tr., p.9, LS.6-11 (fantasy 
evidence); 5/11/10 Tr., p.23, L.18 - p.28, L.2, p.29, L.23 - p.31, L.23 (pornography 
6 
evidence); R., pp.175-76 (both fantasy and pornography evidence), p.243 (pornography 
evidence). 
Mr. Russo's case went to trial in August of 2010. (See generally 8/2/10 
Tr.; 8/3/10 Tr.; 8/4/10 Tr.; 8/5/10 Tr.) It appears that, at trial, the cell phone video was 
admitted in two different forms.12 First, Exhibit 47, a video made by the Idaho State 
Police as officers went through the contents of the cell phone including, presumably, the 
video in question, was admitted. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.494, L.2 - p.497, L.15; Ex. 47.) 
Next, Exhibit 49, an "enhanced" version of the video, complete with still captures of 
certain frames, was admitted. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.502, L.3 - p.511, L.11; Ex. 49.) In 
addition, there was substantial argument and testimony regarding the video. (See, e.g., 
8/2/10 Tr., p.185, LS.14-20 (prosecutor's opening statement referencing the video and 
asserting that it "shows the defendant raping [J.W.]"); 8/2/10 Tr., p.226, Ls.1-19 (J.W.'s 
testimony that Det. King showed her a video, and that she identified herself in that video 
because "I know my vagina, and I know just how I am. I just knew it was me"); 8/3/10 
Tr., p.492, LS.20-25 (Det. King describing the contents of the video); 8/3/10 Tr., p.511, 
L.21 - p.512, L.5 (Det. King identifying certain characteristics of the female in the 
video); 8/4/10 Tr., p.91, L.17 - p.94, L.10 (Dr. Lisa Minge discussing the physiology of 
12 All of the exhibits in this case which contain sexual content, i.e., Exhibits 4-6 (photos 
of the victim's pubic area), Exhibit 47 (video of officers going through Mr. Russo's cell 
phone), Exhibit 49 ("enhanced" video from Mr. Russo's cell phone), Exhibit 51 
(pornography allegedly found in Mr. Russo's car), were retained by the district court. 
Accordingly, those exhibits have not yet been viewed by undersigned counsel. 
Contemporaneously herewith though, Mr. Russo is filing a motion to transport these 
exhibits to the Supreme Court (and held under seal), so that they may be viewed by 
undersigned counsel and considered in conjunction with this appeal. Obviously, if 
undersigned counsel's review of these exhibits reveals any error in this brief, counsel 
will take all appropriate steps to remedy that error. Likewise, if counsel's review of 
these exhibits changes the analysis as to which issues can or should be presented on 
appeal, or alters the analysis of any of the issues presented on appeal, counsel will 
seek leave to file a revised or supplemental brief. 
7 
the female in the video, comparing it to that of J.W., and offering her expert opinion that 
J.W. is the female in the video); 8/4/10 Tr., p.155, Ls.15-24, p.159, LS.9-20 
(prosecutor's closing argument reminding the jurors of the video and arguing that 
Mr. Russo and J.W. are the two individuals depicted therein).) 
Also admitted at Mr. Russo's trial was evidence and argument concerning 
Mr. Russo's rape fantasies and his alleged possession of pornography depicting 
simulated rapes. With regard to the fantasies, the State offered the testimony of 
Det. Weekes, who detailed Mr. Russo's statements on this topic: 
Q. . . .. Did you and Mr. Russo have a conversation with regards 
to pornography? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. And can you briefly describe what you were talking about-or I'll 
back up. 
What type of pornography did he describe? 
A. He described watching pornography that depicted rape. 
Q. And did he tell you what happens when he watches this type of 
pornography? 
A. He did. He told me that it turns him on and it makes him want to 
have sex. 
Q. Did he, in your conversation, provide to you when he first started 
viewing this type of pornography? 
A. He did. Mr. Russo explained to me that he believed he was 
approximately 15 or 16 years old the first time he saw a video that 
depicted rape. And he described that portion of that video to me. 
Q. And what was his description? 
A. He told me that the video was a female that a male had taken 
out into the desert, and he had began raping this female. And in the 
video, during the rape, the female decided that she liked it and became 
happy and wanted to become a participant in it. And that's how he 
described that video taking place. 
8 
Q. And did he go further and to say what type of fantasies were 
developed from watching this video? 
A. He talked-he talked to me about his fantasies that he had, yes. 
Q. And what were those fantasies, detective? 
A. He told me he had abnormal violent sexual fantasies. 
Q. And can you briefly go into the conversation that you had with 
Mr. Russo and what he told you? 
A. I was talking to him about his fantasies and explained to him-I 
told him that he didn't have fantasies like everybody else did. And he told 
me he had abnormal sexual fantasies. And I told him he had violent 
sexual fantasies. And initially, he told me he didn't. And I said, "Mike, 
rape is violent." And he said, "you're right. Rape is violent. I shouldn't 
deny that. I have violent abnormal sexual fantasies." But he minimized it 
by saying that but [sic] his fantasies-his words are he minimized that 
because at least in his fantasies, he wasn't hitting or punching someone. 
Q. And did he go further into any specifics of what type of fantasy, 
exactly, that he had? 
A. He did. He told me that he had a fantasy about raping a woman, 
and in the middle of it, she would decide she wanted it, and would 
basically become a willing participant in that. 
(8/4/10 Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.42, L.9.) 
With regard to the pornography, the State offered Exhibits 50 (a photo of 
Mr. Russo's Mazda 626) and 51 (printed pornographic images depicting simulated rape) 
through Detective King, who testified that the pornography was found in Mr. Russo's 
Mazda 626, along with registration and insurance paperwork for that vehicle showing 
Mr. Russo as the owner of that vehicle. 13 (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.513, L.13 - p.517, L.11, 
p.549, L.10-18.) Further, although the jurors could certainly have evaluated Exhibit 51 
13 Detective King also testified about rape pornography allegedly found in a Jeep 
Cherokee (see 8/3/10 Tr., p.517, L.22 - p.523, L.11, p.549, Ls.19-24); however, that 
testimony was later stricken based on the tenuousness of Mr. Russo's connection to 
that vehicle (see 8/4/10 Tr., p.96, L.22 - p.104, L.25, p.105, L.20 - p.106, L.6, p.109, 
Ls.9-25). 
9 
for themselves, Det. King nevertheless described the pornographic images depicted 
therein: 
A male holding a female down by the shoulders as she's nude. Another 
male penetrating her vagina with his penis. There's also another photo of 
the same female, her mouth being penetrated by the male. . .. Bride 
abuse is at the corner here, brideabuse.com. Well, I've seen this type of 
picture before, and I know what Bride Abuse is, so you can't see dot-com, 
but I believe it's brideabuse.com. 
(8/3/10 Tr., p.516, Ls.16-25.) 
Finally, in its closing argument, the State referenced both the rape fantasies and 
the rape porn as follows: "[R]eturn to what Detective Weekes and her conversations 
with Mr. Russo about his sexual fantasies, how this makes him feel powerful, how it 
makes him feel in control, these rapes. He watches the pornography. It has the rape in 
it." (8/4/10 Tr., p.159, Ls.3-8.) 
Ultimately, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. (8/5/10 Tr., p.5, L.18 -
p.6, L.8; R., pp.369-70.) Thereafter, the district court imposed an aggregate sentence 
of fixed life. (See 11/30/10 Tr., p.96, Ls.4-16; R., pp.413-14.) The district court then 
entered its judgment of conviction on December 1,2010. (R., pp.413-14.) 
On December 28,2010, Mr. Russo filed a notice of appeal. (R., pp.415-16.) On 
appeal, he contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress the cell phone 
video, and in allowing the State to offer evidence and argument concerning his deviant 
sexual interests. 
10 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in failing to suppress the video discovered by police in an 
unconstitutional search of Mr. Russo's cell phone? 
2. Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence 
concerning Mr. Russo's deviant sexual interests? 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Video Discovered In An 
Unconstitutional Search Of Mr. Russo's Cell Phone 
A. Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the following 
guarantee: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend IV.14 This text embodies a Constitutional preference that 
governmental searches and seizures be undertaken pursuant to warrants. Thus, it has 
been held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). "The burden of proof rests with the State to 
demonstrate that [a given warrantless] search either fell within a well-recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
circumstances." State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). Traditionally, it has been 
held that if the State fails to meet its burden in this regard, and the search in question is 
determined to be unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule precludes the State from using 
its ill-gotten evidence against the defendant at trial. State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 
14 The Idaho Constitution provides a guarantee that is virtually identical to that of the 
Fourth Amendment. See IDAHO CONST. Article I § 17. 
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915 (Ct. App. 2006); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (referring to the 
exclusionary rule as "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments"). 
In this case, the district court did not reach the issue of whether Mr. Russo or his 
phone were improperly searched; instead, it ruled that even if the searches were 
undertaken in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule would not apply 
since the video found on the phone would have inevitably been discovered by the police 
anyway. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) The district court reasoned that it was 
inevitable that the video would have been discovered because, even though the first 
search warrant had not arrived yet, it had been issued and it authorized a search for 
phones and implicitly authorized a forensic search of those phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, 
L.22 - p.83, L.23.) 
Mr. Russo submits that the district court's ruling was in error. Below, he explains 
why the searches of his person and his phone violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Thereafter, he explains why the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule 
does not apply and why the proper remedy for the Fourth Amendment violations, 
therefore, was exclusion of the ill-gotten evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The appellate court 
must accept those of the trial court's findings of fact which were supported by 
substantial evidence, but it can freely review the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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C. The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video 
As noted, Mr. Russo contends that the officers' search of his person, then his cell 
phone, was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. This is so for two reasons: 
first, although a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the search of his residence and 
motorcycle, that warrant did not extend to a search of his person where he was 
detained outside of his residence; second, the Terry exception to the warrant 
requirement cannot justify a search of Mr. Russo's person under the facts of this case 
and, even if it could, the search of Mr. Russo's phone was not a valid Terry search. 
Mr. Russo further contends that, because discovery of the cell phone video was 
not inevitable under the facts of this case, the exclusionary rule applies such that the 
district court erred in failing to suppress the fruits of the officers' unconstitutional search 
of his phone. 
1. Under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), Even If Mr. Russo Was 
Properly Detained While Officers Obtained And Executed A Search 
Warrant For His Residence, He Could Not Be Searched Pursuant To That 
Warrant 
Michigan v. Summers involved facts analogous, in many respects, to those in this 
case. In Summers, police were preparing to execute a search warrant on a residence 
when they encountered the owner of the house heading down his front steps; the 
officers detained him and, eventually, searched him (finding contraband on his person). 
Summers, 452 U.S. at 693. The question in that case was whether the Fourth 
Amendment permits officers to temporarily detain the occupant of a residence while 
they search the house pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate. Id. at 694. The 
Supreme Court held that it does. Id. at 705. 
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In light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Summers, therefore, 
there is little doubt that the police in this case were acting within the strictures of the 
Fourth Amendment when they detained Mr. Russo outside his home as they obtained 
and executed a search warrant for his home. See id.; see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 
U.S. 326, 331-34 (2001) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the detention of the 
occupant outside of his home (in what was less than a full arrest) while a search warrant 
was being obtained). 
However, just because Mr. Russo could be detained to: (1) "prevent[ ] flight in 
the event that incriminating evidence is found"; (2) "minimize[e] the risk of harm to the 
officers"; and (3) facilitate "the orderly completion of the search," i.e., provide access to 
the police so that they did not destroy his residence, id. at 702-03, that does not mean 
that he could also be searched. In fact, the Summers Court spoke to this very issue 
and held that because the occupant was found outside the place or thing to be 
searched pursuant to the warrant, i.e., the residence, the warrant itself did not allow for 
a search of his person while he was being detained. Id. at 694. The Court stated as 
follows: 
The State attempts to justify the eventual search of respondent's person 
by arguing that the authority to search premises granted by the warrant 
implicitly included the authority to search persons on those premises, just 
as that authority included an authorization to search furniture and 
containers in which the particular things described might be concealed. 
But ... even if otherwise acceptable, this argument could not justify the 
initial detention of respondent outside the premises described in the 
warrant. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Because a search warrant does not extend beyond the place or thing to be 
searched, see id., and because the original search warrant in this case authorized only 
the searches of Mr. Russo's residence and motorcycle (R., p.134), the search of 
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Mr. Russo's person (and, by extension, the phone found on his person), while he was 
outside his residence, was clearly not conducted in accordance with the warrant. Thus, 
that search is presumptively unconstitutional and it is the State's burden to demonstrate 
that a well recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. 
2. Even If Mr. Russo Was Validly Detained, Under The Standards Set Forth 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), There Was No Basis To Search Him 
For Weapons And, Even If There Was, The Officers' Search Of 
Mr. Russo's Phone Far Exceeded What Was Permissible Under Terry 
When police officers detain occupants of residences being searched pursuant to 
magistrate-issued warrants, they need not due so at undue undue personal risk. Thus, 
in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), the Supreme Court held that it was 
constitutionally permissible for officers to handcuff the detain occupants of the residence 
being searched because, under the facts of that case, the execution of the warrant was 
"inherently dangerous.,,15 Id. at 99-100. 
Likewise, many courts have held that it is constitutionally permissible for officers 
to frisk the detained occupants of the residence being searched where the officers have 
a reasonable articulable suspicion that the detainees are armed and dangerous. For 
example, in Germany v. United States, 984 A.2d 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the D.C. Circuit 
held that, under "the totality of the circumstances" (which included the facts that officers 
were searching for both guns and drugs, it was dark, the officers were badly 
outnumbered by the "partying" occupants, and the defendant was wearing a coat under 
which a weapon could be concealed), the officers had a "reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that appellant might be armed and dangerous," such that they "acted lawfully 
15 In Mena, officers were searching for weapons in the residence of a wanted gang 
member, and the officers were outnumbered at a 2: 1 ratio. Mena, 544 U.S. at 100. 
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in performing a pat-down frisk of appellant for weapons." Id. at 1228-30. The Germany 
Court was very clear, however, in explaining that the "pat-down frisk" approved of was 
no more intrusive than the limited search authorized in Terry, see id. at 1222 n. 7, and 
that, by approving of the pat-down frisk in that case, it most certainly was "not hold[ing] 
that, in every case, police may frisk all occupants of a residence being searched 
pursuant to a warrant" because, "[a]s Professor LaFave aptly puts it, 'it remains clear 
that there is no authority justifying the police to "routinely" frisk those present at any 
search warrant execution.'" Id. at 1230 n.19 (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.9(d) (4th ed. Supp. 2009-10)). 
Apparently, most jurisdictions are in accord with the D.C. Circuit on this issue. 
See Germany, 984 A.2d at 1230 n.19 (compiling cases wherein other courts had 
approved of Terry frisks of detainees at search warrant executions, based on the theory 
that there was reasonable basis to believe that those detainees were armed and 
dangerous). Certainly Idaho is one such jurisdiction. In State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643 
(Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals applied the Terry standard to a situation in which, 
while police were executing a warrant at a residence, an individual approached that 
residence and was detained pursuant to Summers, supra. Id. at 459-61. The Court of 
Appeals held that the subsequent frisk of that individual was constitutionally permissible 
because, under the facts of that case (it was late at night; the individual supplied a 
dubious explanation for why he was present; officers were investigating a suspected 
guns-for-drugs operation; and the individual was wearing a "fanny pack" which could 
have concealed a weapon), it was reasonable to believe that the individual was armed 
and dangerous, and engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 461. 
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In light of this standard, the first question in this case is whether, when Detective 
Pelfreyman and Cain detained Mr. Russo, there was evidence to support a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that he was armed and presently dangerous. Mr. Russo submits 
that there was no such evidence. It was nearly noon, so lighting would not have been a 
concern; Mr. Russo was alone and, therefore, outnumbered by the officers; Mr. Russo 
was wearing jeans and a shirt (R., p.142) and, therefore, would have had little 
opportunity to conceal a weapon; and Mr. Russo was already in handcuffs by the time 
he was searched (see R., p.142), so even if he had a weapon, it would have been 
difficult, if not impossible, to access and use effectively. Moreover, the district court 
specifically found that U[t]he officers had not observed the defendant to do anything 
illegal. The officers did not see the defendant with any weapon. And the officers did not 
see the defendant act in a threatening manner." (1/27/10 Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.69, L.2.) 
The only fact which could have raised any security concern for the officers at all was 
that J.W.'s rapist used a knife to gain her compliance; however, the officers would have 
had no reason to suspect that (even assuming they had the right suspect in their midst) 
Mr. Russo still had the knife on him, hours after the rape, as he checked his mail. In 
short, there was no reasonable basis to believe that Mr. Russo was armed and 
dangerous when he was detained by the police and, therefore, the search of his person 
was impermissible under Terry and Kester. 
Even if the pat-down frisk of Mr. Russo's person was somehow permissible 
though, the fact is that once his cell phone was identified as such-and certainly once it 
was removed from Mr. Russo's reach-it was not subject to further search. First, a 
phone is not a weapon, so once the item in Mr. Russo's pocket was identified as a 
phone, the officers had no right to invade Mr. Russo's privacy further by seizing it or 
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searching its contents. State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730 (Ct. App. 2005) (HAfter 
satisfying themselves that the item was a container and not a weapon, however, the 
officers had no valid reason to further invade Faith's right to be free of police intrusion 
absent reasonable cause to arrest him. . . . We conclude that the officers' removal of 
the Altoids tin from Faith's person was beyond the permissible limits of Terry and was a 
violation of Faith's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search."). 
Second, even if the cell phone itself is considered to be a weapon, the data 
stored on a cell phone is not, under any circumstances, a weapon. Accordingly, an 
officer would never be within his rights to peruse the contents of a cell phone as part of 
a protective frisk. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 ("The sole justification of the search in the 
present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must 
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, 
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer."). 
Third, to the extent that a cell phone or its contents could somehow be construed 
as posing a threat to the detaining officers, as soon as that phone was taken out of 
Mr. Russo's reach, it ceased to be a threat and, therefore, could not be searched 
further. See Faith, 141 Idaho at 730-31 (holding that even if officers were concerned 
that an Altoids tin might contain a weapon, once that tin was removed from the 
handcuffed suspect's reach, it could no longer be construed as posing a threat and, 
therefore, H[t]he opening of the box and inspection of its contents was unlawful"). In 
other words, as soon as the risk attendant to the item in question abates, so too does 
the justification for the search of that item. See id.; cf. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 
343 (2011) (making it clear that in a search incident to arrest, officers may search the 
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arrestee's vehicle for officer safety reasons only to the extent that the vehicle, and any 
weapons that may be contained therein, are reasonably within the arrestee's reach). 
In light of the foregoing, it is incontrovertible that the removal of the cell phone 
from Mr. Russo's pants pocket, and the subsequent search of the data stored on that 
cell phone, cannot be justified under the Terry frisk exception to the warrant 
requirement. Accordingly, the State failed to establish that a well-recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement applies in this case and it is apparent that Mr. Russo's rights 
were violated. 
3. Because The "Inevitable Discovery" Doctrine Has No Application In This 
Case, The Exclusionary Rule Applies And The District Court Erred In 
Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video 
"The exclusionary rule is the judicial remedy for addressing illegal searches and 
bars the admission or use of evidence gathered pursuant to an illegal search." State v. 
Bunting, 142 Idaho 908,915 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,496 
(2001 ». While there are some exceptions to the general rule requiring the exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence, the State bears the burden of pleading of proving these 
exceptions by a preponderance of the evidence. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
444-45 & n.5 (1984). 
One exception to the exclusionary rule is the so-called "inevitable discovery" 
doctrine. See id. at 441-48. In order for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply, the 
State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the information at issue 
would have independently been discovered through lawful means. Bunting, 142 Idaho 
at 915. 
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In applying the inevitable discovery doctrine and determining whether the 
evidence at issue would have inevitably been discovered through lawful means 
independent of the illegal search, the reviewing court is not permitted to assume the 
hypothetical of what would have been discovered had the officer acted lawfully. Rather, 
there must be a showing that some other independent action was already taking place, 
or had taken place, that would have revealed the same evidence. Id. at 916-917. The 
Bunting Court made this abundantly clear: 
The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that a 
preponderance of the evidence proves that some action that actually took 
place, or was in the process of taking place, would have led to the 
discovery of the evidence that was already obtained through unlawful 
police action. The inevitable discovery doctrine was not intended to allow 
a court to consider what actions the authorities should or could have taken 
and in doing so then determine that lawful discovery of the already 
unlawfully obtained evidence would have been inevitable. 
Bunting, 142 Idaho at 916-917 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). In fact, 
more than 25 years ago, the Court of Appeals put it more bluntly: "The [inevitable 
discovery] doctrine 'is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by 
substituting what the police should have done for what they really did.'" State v. 
Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Judge Burnett's concurring 
opinion in State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 226 (Ct. App. 1984». Thus, recently, in 
State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, _,267 P.3d 1278, 1285 (Ct. App. 2011), the Court of 
Appeals declined to apply the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule 
just because an investigation may have reached the same result absent the Fourth 
Amendment violation. The Liechty Court observed as follows: 
[T]he issue before us whether an additional line of investigation would 
have revealed the [contraband], not whether the evidence would have 
been discovered had the encounter between the officer and Liechty not 
occurred while the officer was standing in the open passenger doorway 
[the Fourth Amendment violation]. Indeed, we decline to predict how such 
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a conversation would have unfolded. The record does not disclose any 
additional line of investigation and, as a result, the inevitable discovery 
doctrine does not apply. 
Liechty, 267 P.3d at 1285. 
In this case, the inevitable discovery doctrine has no application. The State's 
argument below was that, even had the detectives not (impermissibly) searched 
Mr. Russo's phone when they did, once they realized that he had a phone on his 
person, they would have obtained a new search warrant (such as the amended warrant 
that was actually issued in this case) authorizing a search of that phone. 16 (See 1/27/10 
Tr., p.44, Ls.2-6; R., p.119.) This, however, would not have been an independent line of 
investigation; it would have simply been a continuation of the already-existing line of 
investigation, which does not satisfy the standards of the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
See Liechty, 267 P.3d at 1285; Bunting, 142 Idaho at 916-917; Holman, 109 Idaho at 
392. Furthermore, simply asserting that, had the officers not searched the phone 
illegally they would have obtained a warrant to search that phone is doing nothing more 
substituting what the police should have done for what they really did. Again, this fails 
to satisfy the standards of inevitable discovery doctrine. Holman, 109 Idaho at 392. 
16 Insofar as the State attempts to argue that the contents of the phone would have 
inevitably been discovered because of issuance of the actual amended search warrant 
in this case, that argument would be absurd because the State used the fruits of its 
illegal search of that phone to obtain the amended warrant. (R., p.154 (stating in the 
affidavit in support of the request for an amended warrant that "a cellular phone was 
recovered from Mr. Russo's person during a pat down search for officer safety. This 
phone was opened and looked at to determine ownership. Your affiant knows that a 
video was located on that phone that appears to depict the victim from this morning's 
rape. . .. Your affiant requests permission to search the entirety of the phone).) Not 
only does this satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine's requirement of an independent 
line of investigation, but it also violates the basic principle that a search that is unlawful 
at its inception cannot be validated by what it turns up. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471,484 (1963). 
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Likewise, the district court's application of the inevitable discovery doctrine was in 
error, albeit for a different reason. This district court concluded that it was inevitable 
that the cell phone video would have been discovered because, even though the 
original search warrant had not arrived yet, that warrant had been issued and it 
authorized a search for phones, which implicitly authorized a forensic search of those 
phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) Thus, the district court appears to have 
assumed that, had the original search warrant been present on-scene, it would have 
authorized a search of Mr. Russo's person and the cell phone kept on his person. (See 
1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) However, this reason is flawed since, for the 
reasons set forth in Part I(C)(1), supra, a search warrant authorizing a search of a 
residence does not extend to the person of someone detained outside the residence. 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Russo submits that the State has failed to prove that 
an exception to the exclusionary rule applies and, therefore, the district court erred in 
failing to suppress the evidence obtained in the illegal search of Mr. Russo's phone. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer Irrelevant, Highly Prejudicial 
Evidence And Argument Concerning Mr. Russo's Deviant Sexual Interests 
A. Introduction 
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404, evidence of a defendant's bad character or 
bad acts may not admitted to show that the he is a person who acted in conformance 
with his bad character. Evidence of the defendant's bad acts may be admitted for other 
purposes though, such as to prove motive, intent, or plan. 
In this case, the district court allowed the State to present evidence that 
Mr. Russo has had sexual fantasies involving rape, and that he possessed pornography 
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depicting simulated rape, ostensibly to show that the Mr. Russo had the motive, intent, 
and plan to rape J.W. However, because the rape fantasy and rape pornography 
evidence does not evidence any motive, intent, or plan on Mr. Russo's part to rape J.W. 
and because, even if it did, its probative value was so substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect, the district court erred in allowing the State to present this evidence to 
the jury. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that, generally speaking, evidence of "other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that the person acted in conformity therewith." I.R.E. 404(b). However, such 
evidence may be admitted "for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... " 
Id. 
Under I.R.E. 404(b), there is a two-tiered analysis for determining the 
admissibility of "prior bad act" evidence. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). The 
court must first "determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other 
crime or wrong as fact" and "whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if established, 
would be relevant ... to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, 
other than propensity." Id. If the evidence is insufficient to establish the other crime or 
wrong as fact, or if the other crime or wrong, even if proven, is not relevant to an issue 
other than character or propensity, it is inadmissible and the inquiry ends. See id. 
However, if the evidence is sufficient to prove the other crime or wrong, and that crime 
or wrong is relevant to some valid issue, the court must then "engage in a balancing 
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under I.RE. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence." Id. 
Turning to the question of the applicable standard of review, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has held that the district court's determination that the evidence in question is 
relevant to some issue besides the defendant's bad character is reviewed de novo, but 
the district court's balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the unfair 
prejudice to the defendant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Miller, 141 
Idaho 148, 150 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer Irrelevant, Highly 
Prejudicial Evidence And Argument Concerning Mr. Russo's Deviant Sexual 
Interests 
As noted, prior to Mr. Russo's trial, the State sought leave to offer extensive 
evidence of Mr. Russo's other crimes, wrongs, or acts, including evidence that he has 
had sexual fantasies about rape and has possessed pornography depicting simulated 
rape. The State argued that the fantasy and pornography evidence was relevant to a 
non-character/non-propensity issue-Mr. Russo's motive, intent, or plan-and, 
therefore, was admissible under I.RE. 404(b). (R, pp.45, 59-60, 88, 187-227, 228-35, 
237; 3/18/10 Tr., p.8, L.14 - p.19, L.11; 5/11/10 Tr., p.3, L.15 - p.4, L.19, p.5, L.20-
p.6, L.17, p.9, L.20 - p.11, L.3.) The district court agreed, and it ruled the rape fantasy 
and rape pornography evidence admissible. (See R, pp.175-76, 243; 3/18/10 Tr., p.67, 
L.14 - p.69, L.9, p.77, L.25 - p.78, L.10; 4/22/10 Tr., p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.13; 5/11/10 
Tr., p.18, L.7 - p.25, L.22, p.29, L.23 - p.31, L.23.) 
Mr. Russo contends that the district court's ruling was in error, as it was based on 
a faulty application of the Grist standard. Specifically, Mr. Russo asserts that the rape 
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fantasy and rape pornography evidence is not relevant to any proper purpose and, even 
if it is marginally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice. 
1. The Rape Fantasy And Rape Pornography Evidence In This Case Was 
Relevant Only To Mr. Russo's Character 
Taken together, evidence of Mr. Russo's sexual fantasies involving rape and his 
possession of pornography depicting simulated rape tend to show only that Mr. Russo is 
sexually aroused by the thought and/or depiction of rape. It is not probative of whether 
he was the one who actually raped J.W. on August 27, 2009; nor is it probative of any 
actual plan or intent to rape J.W. Indeed, the only way that this evidence can be 
characterized as showing Mr. Russo's intent or plan to rape is to assume that because 
Mr. Russo has a predilection for rape, he must have planned or intended to act in 
conformity with that predilection; however, this is precisely the type of baseless 
generalization that Rule 404 is intended to guard against. That Rule makes it clear that, 
just because someone has done a certain act, shown a certain propensity, or exhibited 
a certain character trait in the past, one cannot assume that he acted accordingly on the 
date in question. See I.R.E. 404. Indeed, in this case, the prosecution never 
attempted-either in arguing its motions in limine, or in arguing its case to the jury at 
trial-to connect Mr. Russo's predilection for rape to any particular plan or scheme to 
rape J.W.17 
The only (proper) issue that Mr. Russo's predilection for rape could possibly be 
relevant to would be motive. The theory, perhaps, would be that, given Mr. Russo's 
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predilections, he raped J.W. to satisfy his sexual desires; under this argument, sexual 
gratification would be the motive. However, such an argument would make little sense 
in a case such as this one. Quite obviously, anyone who breaks into a young woman's 
apartment, clearly for the sole purpose of raping her, does so for the purpose of sating 
his sexual urges. Thus, motive is simply not at issue in this case. Cf. State v. Roach, 
109 Idaho 973, 974-75 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that even in the case of a specific intent 
crime, such as lewd conduct with a minor, because "the intent needed to convict can be 
manifested by the circumstances attending the act," the defendant's intent may not be 
sufficiently at issue in the case to warrant introduction of "other crimes" evidence aimed 
at proving intent). Moreover, even if the motive of sexual gratification were somehow 
relevant to this case, this motive has in no way been shown to be specific to J.W. 
Accordingly, even if Mr. Russo had a motive to rape generally, this motive in no way 
connects him particularly to the rape of J.W. 
2. Even If The Rape Fantasy And Rape Pornography Evidence In This Case 
Was Relevant To Such Proper Topics As Motive, Intent, Or Plan, It Was 
Nonetheless Inadmissible Because Its Probative Value Was Substantially 
Outweighed By The Risk Of Unfair Prejudice To Mr. Russo 
Assuming arguendo that there is some relevance to the evidence demonstrating 
Mr. Russo's predilection for rape, the probative value of any such evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice attendant to that evidence. 
Accordingly, he contends that the district court erred in finding it admissible under Rule 
404(b). 
17 Certainly, the State did raise the inference that J.W.'s rape was a carefully planned 
crime. And the evidence supports this inference. But the State never attempted to 
explain how Mr. Russo's rape fetish connected to any particular plan. 
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Initially, as noted in Part II(C)(1), supra, it is Mr. Russo's contention that evidence 
of his rape fantasies and his possession of pornography depicting simulated rape is 
wholly irrelevant to anything other than character or propensity; in particular, he 
contends that it is not relevant to motive, intent, or plan. However, even if this Court 
determines that such evidence is relevant to an issue such as motive, intent, or plan, 
Mr. Russo contends that it is only marginally relevant (for same reasons, set forth 
above, that he contends that it is not relevant at all). 
More importantly, Mr. Russo contends that this evidence is extraordinarily 
prejudicial. As noted, it demonstrates a predilection for rape which, in the average 
juror's mind, would likely be viewed as an extremely deviant and disturbing preference. 
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that, traditionally, there has been 
an "unstated belief that sexual deviancy is a character trait of especially powerful 
probative value for predicting a defendant's behavior," State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 
569-70 (2007) (quoting D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook § 13.9 (1995)), so any 
such evidence would tend to have a significant impact on the jury's verdict. Thus, in 
recent years, the Idaho courts have repeatedly recognized that evidence of extreme 
sexual deviancy is simply too prejudicial to the defendant to be put before the jury 
where its probative value is marginal. See, e.g., State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459,466 
(Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]here was a high risk that the jury would convict Pokorney based 
upon propensity and sexual deviancy. We are constrained to conclude that the unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence."); State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669-70 (2010) (finding that the error in admitting prior 
instances of the defendant's sexual misconduct with children was not harmless because 
U[e]vidence of prior sexual misconduct with young children is so prejudicial that there is 
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a reasonable possibility this error contributed to Johnson's conviction"). As this is just 
such a case, it is apparent that the district court erred in concluding that the probative 
value of the rape fantasy and rape pornography evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and, therefore, the district court erred in 
admitting that evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Russo respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the district court orders denying suppression of the cell phone video and 
admitting evidence of his sexual fantasies and pornography; that it vacate his 
convictions and sentences; and that it remand his case for a new trial. 
DATED this 20th day of March, 2012. 
EF\L~R. LEHTINE~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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